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Over the last 10 years, scholars have started to focus on African states’ bureaucracies by
investigating public servants’ relationships with the state, their professional ethos, how they
appropriate reforms, and the way they interact with citizens. With inheritance disputes as a
focal point, this article highlights the users’ perspective—which is often overlooked—and
asks how litigants in Cotonou (Benin) see the state, appropriate legal reforms, and use
the courts. It shows that citizens, despite a general sense that the court system is corrupt
and ineffective, continue to use it because state institutions convey a form of authority
that allows them either to legitimize or challenge family decisions in inheritance matters.
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“After someone dies, problems with the family are almost inevitable,” explained Catherine,1
a thirty-year-old widow and mother of two.2 Her husband, Pierre, died in 2011, leaving
behind four children—two of whom were from relationships Pierre had had with other
women. Because they were having marriage problems at the time of Pierre’s death, Cather-
ine was immediately suspected of having poisoned him. Pierre’s family organized meetings
to try to figure out what had happened. Six months later, they decided to appoint Germaine,
Pierre’s older sister, as principal executor and Catherine as coexecutor, since by law two
people are required. They were to manage Pierre’s estate until it was liquidated, which
consisted of some money in the bank, one car, and two houses. In March 2012, they went to
Cotonou’s high court to validate the report of the family meetings that they had written. The
judge insisted that Catherine, and not Germaine, should be the principal executor, contrary
to what the family had decided. Six months after the first hearing, Catherine went back to
court to report the difficulties in collaborating with Germaine. As she explained to me:
I noticed that money was disappearing from my husband’s account. I tried to
get in touch with my sister-in-law, but she refused to help. She said the money
was meant for the children, because I would get the widow’s pension anyway.
The judge already knew about our case, so I requested another hearing, and I
asked him to tell her [Germaine] how the money should be shared.3
The Beninese Code des personnes et de la famille (Code on Persons and Family, CPF),
which has regulated how inheritance disputes should be settled since 2004, grants surviving
spouses one-fourth of the deceased’s property, with the rest to be shared equally among
surviving children.4 By involving the courts, Catherine wanted to make sure that she would
get what she was entitled to.
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In Cotonou, the economic center of Benin,5 inheritance disputes are a source of tension
in many families, and a significant number of them end up in court: more than a thousand
inheritance cases have been filed every year since the introduction of digitized records
in 2010. To show how formal reforms can sometimes achieve their intended effects—
in this case, promoting gender and generational equality—regardless of formal judicial
enforcement, in this article I focus on the ways in which the citizens of Cotonou appropriate
the CPF and mobilize lower-level state courts to renegotiate the way property is distributed
within their families.
From the 1990s onward, judicial reforms have been implemented all across the African
continent (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006; Rubbers and Gallez 2015). While their effects
on public services and legal professions have been examined (Anders 2010; Bierschenk
and Olivier de Sardan 2014), there has been limited concern for the consequences in
the everyday lives of ordinary people (cf. Andreetta 2018; Rubbers and Gallez 2012).
This article draws on the ethnography of African bureaucracies (Bierschenk and Olivier
de Sardan 2014; Blundo and Le Meur 2009; Olivier de Sardan 2004) and on sociolegal
studies (Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat 1981; Galanter 1974; Merry 1990) to reflect on the
particularities of state courts in a context where public services are generally described as
ineffective and must therefore be “coproduced” by private actors (Bierschenk 2014; Lund
2006; Titeca and De Herdt 2011). I argue that by appealing to the courts, those on the lower
rungs of family hierarchies—particularly sisters and widows—manage to transform power
relationships to their advantage. The symbolic power of the state and the normativities that
its laws create, which render land rights quantifiable and divisible, allow these women to
renegotiate the way decisions are made and properties distributed among family members.
Inheritance claims, therefore, illustrate the importance of formal norms and institutions in
understanding social processes in Africa.
When it comes to studying the resolution of disputes, scholars have mainly focused on
“traditional” or “nonstate” laws and courts (Benda-Beckmann 1981; Claassens and Mnisi
Weeks 2009; Griffiths 1998, 2011). Griffiths (1990, 2011) specifically focused on inheri-
tance disputes in rural courts, arguing that despite the relative social and economic positions
of men and women usually making it harder for women to access property, customary laws
were not necessarily disadvantageous to women. In the anglophone literature, inheritance
claims have indeed mainly been studied as part of two interconnected subfields: gender
dynamics and land rights (Kingwill 2016; Peters 2010). These scholars have highlighted
the relative failure of land rights reforms to promote women’s rights and access to property
(Berry 2002; Haugerud 1989; Peters 2010), insisting on the importance of legal pluralism
and the diluted power of state law (Himonga 2011). More recently, other scholars have
started looking at the family law reforms in West Africa, where “modern law” is often at
odds with religious norms (N’Diaye 2015; Vincent-Grosso 2012; Voorhoeve 2012). They
point out that while law is regularly mobilized—by women in particular—judicial decisions
still reproduce “traditional” gender roles and inequalities (Ben Hounet and Rupert 2018).
In the economic capital of Benin, however, women successfully use state law in court to
challenge inequalities and to eventually tip the balance of power within their families.6
In contrast to their rural counterparts (Claassens and Mnisi Weeks 2009; Griffiths 2011;
Peters 2010), most women in Cotonou have some education and generally work as well.
As daughters especially, they contribute their share to the family budget and feel that they
are entitled to an equal share of the common property as stipulated in the CPF.
This article also argues that the “success” of inheritance cases should not be understood
only as a function of the Code or the way its principles are appropriated (Ewick and Sibley
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1998; Merry 1990); litigants’ judicial trajectories also point to the importance of the state
and its symbolic authority in Cotonou. While the question of dispute resolution in Africa
has been an important topic in the anthropological literature for more than fifty years,
critical in-depth studies of the African state only emerged at the end of the 1990s. While
the early contributions treated the state as a source of power (Bayart 1989; Darbon 1990;
Me´dard 1991), at the beginning of the 2000s, a small group of anthropologists advocated
studying African states through their bureaucracies (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan
2014; Blundo and Le Meur 2009). Some of these scholars analyzed the logic underpinning
the (dys)functioning of West African courts (Bako Arifari 2006; Bierschenk 2008; Tidjani
Alou 2007); others reflected on the professional ethos of judges and prosecutors (Andreetta
and Kolloch 2018; Budniok 2015; Oumarou 2014; Verheul 2013). However, as Rubbers
and Gallez (2012) underline, there was little focus on the litigants’ perspective.
This article builds on a similar foundation of the “local state” as an empirical reality
to understand why people choose state courts as a forum and what this says about how
they see the state and its institutions. Taking litigants’ long-term trajectories into account, I
reflect on the ways in which they use state institutions to produce social or political effects
such as the renegotiation of family hierarchies and access to land. Inheritance cases also
demonstrate that when people take family members to court, the legal proceedings are not
about seeking revenge, punishment, or compensation (Rubbers and Gallez 2012); rather,
they are about redefining relationships among kin.
Bringing together two sets of approaches and their respective ways of analyzing courts—
as legal institutions in state bureaucracies, and as litigation practices—allows me to explore
the specificities of state courts and what they “do” that other forums do not. In her study
of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in Bolivia, Ellison (2017) shows that many of the
residents of El Alto use conciliation as a way of obtaining official-looking documents that
can give concrete form to social obligations among neighbors, family members, or acquain-
tances. Inheritance disputes in Cotonou, on the other hand, show that people opt for formal
proceedings in order to get le cachet de l’ ´Etat (the state’s stamp), which allows them to
validate or renegotiate family decisions. This echoes Merry’s (1990) description of litiga-
tion among working-class people in Massachusetts as “a symbolically powerful resource”
that people use to either “challenge hierarchies which are vulnerable or to defend those
which seem precarious” (87). However, in contrast to their counterparts in Massachusetts,
the litigants of Cotonou do not necessarily lose control over their cases once they go to
court: family members often use legal proceedings as leverage to renegotiate relationships
regardless of the judge’s decision.
This article, therefore, ultimately leads to a methodological suggestion. On the basis of
five extended case studies, it shows how considering litigants’ trajectories beyond (that is,
both before and after) judicial proceedings helps researchers to better understand how and
why people use the courts. These case studies, which I collected between 2010 and 2015,
are part of a wider sample of seventy-five family stories, the protagonists of which I met
either in court, through their lawyers, or in the mediation sessions that they requested. One
limitation of my sampling method, however, is that I had access only to disagreements
that had been made public. I neither attended family reunions, nor did I witness private
conversations with friends, religious leaders, or chefs de quartiers (neighborhood chiefs).7
The majority of the participants in my study belonged to what Jacquemot (2012) defines
as the typical African middle class: they lived in the capital city and worked in the private
sector, in public administration, or as street vendors. Most of them, like 75 percent of
Cotonou’s population, belonged to one or another of the Adja-Fon ethnic groups (Fon,
Mahi, Goun, Mina), which are culturally very similar to each other. The other groups were
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Yoruba or Nago, which account for 11 percent of the residents of Cotonou (Akomagni
2006). In any case, inheritance stories seemed to be more contingent on family situations
than on ethnicity: most cases in court were about women or younger siblings claiming
access to family property, regardless of the ethnic groups involved.
The following sections examine the place of law in family debates, delve into the reasons
that people choose to go to court instead of mobilizing other dispute resolution mechanisms,
and discuss the social effects of legal proceedings. These discourses and legal trajectories
will help provide some nuance to the widespread assumption that African bureaucracies
and formal legal reforms generally fail to fulfill their purpose, leading to the privatization
and externalization of public services (Bierschenk 2008; Lund 2006; Titeca and De Herdt
2011). In the case of the Beninese economic capital, even though judicial decisions are not
always enforced, litigation allows family members to negotiate access to land and redefine
relationships on a more equal footing.
There is, of course, another side to each of these stories: the side of those who have
been summoned to court, who think that family houses should not be sold, who perhaps
took care of their younger siblings for years and think that equal sharing is unfair, or that
inheritance should be reserved for children rather than widows. These arguments and the
ways in which they play out in and out of courts call, however, for analysis that is beyond
the scope of this article.
Inheritance Disputes and the Law
The regulation of inheritance disputes in Benin since 2004 took place in a larger legal
reform that created significant consequences for gender relationships and access to land in
Cotonou. In 1904 Dahomey became a part of the French colonial empire, and French law
was imposed throughout the entire territory (Brunet-La Ruche 2013). However, colonial
administrators reported substantial difficulties in enforcing French law, which is why France
decided to allow its colonies to maintain their own customs in matters of personal status,
marriage, inheritance, donations, and wills (Gbaguidi 1998). From 1912 onward, a dual
system applied to private matters: French citizens and naturalized indigenous peoples fell
under “modern law,” which corresponded to the French Civil Code, while Beninese subjects
were governed by “traditional law” (Kouassigan 1975). In 1946 those different categories
of people were abolished. People could therefore “choose,” through the kind of marriage
they entered into, which legal regime they wanted to be ruled under: French law applied
to those who had a civil marriage ceremony; traditional law applied to the other types of
ceremonies (Gbaguidi 1998).
Whatever the rule of law, when a parent died, a family reunion had to be convened to
identify the heirs and inventory the possessions of the deceased. An administrator was
elected and tasked with taking care of the property until someone asked for it to be shared
out. Traditional rules, under which most of the cases fell, stated that the inheritance was
supposed to be “shared unequally among the children,” although the form this unequal
distribution took depended on ethnicity: in some areas, a larger portion of land was given
to the eldest son; in others, the youngest son received the more substantial share (Gbaguidi
1998). Some of these rules were listed in the Coutumier du Dahomey (Customary of
Dahomey), which judges would refer to for information, but the rules were not legally
binding. The French Civil Code, on the other hand, provided all children with equal
inheritance rights, and gave surviving spouses usufruct rights to properties. This dual legal
system remained in place after Dahomey’s independence in 1960 and did not change until
2004 (Bolle 2002). In practice, the eldest son generally informally acted as the executor of
the family estate until he died, at which time someone else would take over responsibility
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for the estate. Properties were rarely sold or formally transferred from one generation to
the next; if there was a title deed, it often remained in the name of the deceased.
Toward the end of this period of dual legal systems, in 1990, a constitution was drafted
and Benin (renamed from Dahomey) became party to numerous international human rights
agreements. To improve public services, general assessment conferences were organized,
including within the Ministry of Justice. The report that resulted from the Ministry of
Justice’s conference insisted on the need to enact the CPF, a first draft of which had been
submitted to the Beninese national assembly in 1990.8 Most parliamentarians, however,
were reluctant to pass the law. The text was indeed considered too much of a radical break
from existing customary law, especially when it came to the rights of women. Because the
vote kept being postponed, in 2002 the local branch of the nongovernmental organization
Women in Law and Development in Africa organized a protest in front of the Parliament
building, which led to the adoption of the first version of the Code. The Constitutional
Court, however, asked for substantial modifications, including deletion of a clause allowing
polygamous marriages, which were deemed a violation of gender equality. The final version
of the Code was promulgated in 2004 (Bolle 2002).
When it comes to inheritance, the CPF states that, as in the former legal system, a
family reunion has to be convened to list the heirs and the belongings of the deceased.
The participants include but are not limited to all potential heirs as well as the mothers of
any underage children. Together, they also have to appoint two liquidateurs (coexecutors).
Traditional law, deemed detrimental to women’s rights, is abrogated. The CPF also states
that “all children are equal” (CPF, art. 630 and following) and that “no one should be forced
into co-ownership of undivided property; division and sharing of property can always be
insisted upon” (CPF, art. 752 and following).
In addition to granting women rights that they did not have before, the new law therefore
contributes to the increasing commodification of land within the capital city. The principle
according to which “division and sharing of property can always be insisted upon” indeed
makes it easier for family members to sell joint property that used to be inalienable. It also
gives those who had limited access to family resources a substantial argument to redefine
power relationships: the youngest siblings and widows can now force the sale or division
of family properties in order to get their share.
One of the first litigants I met, Anaı¨s, went to court on behalf of her daughter. Anaı¨s
requested that her late “husband’s” bequeathal be sold and the profits shared equally among
all of his children (the deceased had three other children in addition to Anaı¨s’s daughter).
Anaı¨s had not been legally married to the deceased, but according to the CPF, children born
out of wedlock have the same rights as other children, and she wanted to use her daughter’s
share to provide for her. She also wanted to be able to get away from her “husband’s”
family, the members of which she feared could try to harm her and her daughter. With the
money from the proceedings, she was hoping to buy a house for the two of them. Under
the previous legal system, she would probably never have been able to make that claim.
In Cotonou, it is usually men who buy and sell houses. Family relationships are, in almost
all ethnic groups, patrilineal; people therefore expect to inherit from their fathers. Men also
frequently leave behind a large number of potential heirs and, consequently, complex
family relationships and inheritance dynamics. In many cases, parents had married under
the former legal regime, which allowed multiple marriages for men. These families now
consist of several sets of children “from different beds.” Today, even though the law only
acknowledges monogamous marriages, many men still have children with more than one
partner, some of whom are, in all respects but the legal one, their “wives.” Many inheritance
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disputes therefore pit either the children of different women against one another or one of
the “widows” against the rest of the family.
Anaı¨s’s example illustrates how claiming inheritance in Cotonou’s court system has
become a way of accessing property that has considerable financial value. Property values
in Cotonou have been on the rise since at least the 1970s, with land prices increasing by
up to 50 percent between 1970 and 1980 (Grisoni-Niaki 2000). Today, most houses in
Cotonou are worth at least 100 million FCFA (US$168,000). For heirs who find themselves
in difficult financial situations, inherited real estate becomes a highly valued resource both
inside and outside the city center.
What Alternative Dispute Resolution Says about the Way People Use Courts
In Cotonou, family members can take their disagreements to various forums that include
but are not limited to state courts. Women’s rights associations hold mediation sessions
every week, as does Cotonou’s most popular radio station (discussed below). Rather than
being adversarial, most of these forums operate on the idea of getting people to agree to a
solution to their problem, and therefore are able to offer a cheaper, faster dispute resolution
process than the courts.
The following is a case study of taking a family dispute to one of these ADR mechanisms.
Together with other similar cases, it shows that while justice might be “coproduced” by
private actors, in Cotonou even those who go through such a mediation process often believe
that the high courts are still the most relevant and authoritative forum in which to solve
family disputes.
Bernadette is a sixty-eight-year-old street vendor in Cotonou’s market. Her father died in
1958, leaving behind four children: Gertrude, Patrick, Jean, and herself. He owned a house
in the center of Cotonou, as well as several plots of land in the Ouidah region. Together,
the siblings decided that Patrick, as the eldest male, should hold on to the property deeds.
When he died, Jean (the only male sibling remaining) started selling plots from his father’s
estate. He also took it exclusively upon himself to collect rent from the tenants who lived
in the house in Cotonou, and did not share the proceeds with his siblings. At the beginning
of the 2000s, Bernadette, who barely earned enough as a street vendor to get by, asked
for her share of the inheritance. Several family meetings were organized over the years,
yet Jean systematically rejected any kind of sharing arrangement. In 2011 the family chief
suggested that the children go to court. He found a lawyer for them, and took the family to
the first meeting. The attorney asked for 500,000 FCFA (US$840), which they could pay in
several installments. Jean refused to be involved, Bernadette did not have enough money,
and Gertrude was unwilling to cover the whole fee by herself. A couple of months later,
Bernadette instead went to Radio Cotonou, where mediation sessions were organized once
a week.
In the warehouse next to the radio station’s offices, Da Houe´nou,9 a retired civil servant,
sat in front of a wooden desk listening to people’s everyday problems: a couple’s disputes,
claims for small debts between private individuals, arguments between neighbors. After
hearing the “plaintiff,” he would send a written summons to the other people involved. A
mediation session would be organized for the following week with those who showed up.
During that session, Da (what his clients call him) would give his advice on the matter in
the form of an oral “decision.” Sometimes he would refer people to court or to the police
if no amicable solution could be reached.
In Bernadette’s case, the radio station was her second choice. “I wanted to hire a lawyer
and go to court at first, but I didn’t have a penny to pay for it,” she explained. “So I thought,
‘Okay, I will come here.’”10 In a similar case, Andre´, whose older brother was denying his
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younger siblings access to family houses, explained, “If I know the court well, I will go
there on my own. But because I don’t have money, they won’t listen to me. That’s why I
came here to the radio—so they will help me find my way to court.”11
The aforementioned examples show that even for those who use other dispute resolution
mechanisms, state courts are often still perceived to be the most legitimate forum when
family disputes can no longer be dealt with privately. The state courts are the first recourse
they think of, with mediation being either a second choice or a way to make the necessary
social connections to eventually be able to bring the case to court. “I’m hoping Da can
introduce me to a judge, or to a lawyer,” Andre´ explained. “What will I be able to do in
court if I don’t know anyone?”12 This case, among many others, illustrates the importance
of considering litigants’ trajectories across different forums, as people often go from one
to the other, or even use them simultaneously.
Getting the State’s Stamp: Formalizing Family Decisions
According to the CPF, family meeting reports have to be signed by a magistrate, who
makes sure that all the heirs are listed, and agree to the two executors who have been
chosen. Ratifying the minutes of the family meeting is the first reason why people go to
court, which under these circumstances amounts to a mere formality, yet it is one that more
and more people comply with for one or more of three main reasons: to access benefits,
to formalize and ascertain certain roles and decisions, or to challenge power relationships
within the family.
If the deceased was a public servant, heirs need the court-approved family meeting report
to claim the widow’s pension benefits. They also need the judge’s decision to access bank
accounts or to obtain the capital de´ce`s (death benefits), a lump sum of money that most
public administrations provide to help their employees’ families pay for the funerals. Going
to court is, therefore, first and foremost, a way of gaining access to both money and benefits.
The same procedure can be used by those who wish to sell joint properties. I met Robert,
who works for a Belgian development agency, after a hearing in court. He and his brother
and sisters had come to ask that one of their mother’s houses be sold. She had died several
years earlier, and her children had shared the two houses that she left behind. Robert’s
sisters got one of the houses, and the brothers got the other one. The two brothers, however,
had trouble living together, and Robert’s younger brother eventually requested that their
house be sold. The rest of the family agreed but, as Robert explained, they wanted “to make
sure that he [the younger brother] cannot turn against us later on, saying he did not agree
to the sale or the price. We wanted the state’s stamp on it.”13 Similarly, executors whose
position has been confirmed in court frequently insist that their role has been allocated to
them by “the state,” therefore adding authority and legitimacy to their family’s decision.
Finally, in some cases, that same procedure is used by what is often referred to as the
“small ones” of families, such as women or younger siblings, to get access to court and
ask for property to be sold or shared. This is often the case with widows who do not
dare to openly disagree with their dead husband’s family. They are afraid they will be
suspected of having killed him if they seem too eager to settle inheritance matters, but they
also frequently believe that the family will try to exclude them. Among the seventy-five
original research cases, I interviewed eleven widows. Half of them mentioned having been
suspected of “murdering” their husbands, and a few had even been thrown out of the house
that they were living in. Such suspicions, often referring to witchcraft, generally arise when
men die unexpectedly, especially if the couple is known to have had disagreements.
Within such a context, some members use the family reunion report hearing to disagree
with what was written and ask for the properties to be divided or sold, or for a change of
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executors. Other family members, as with Catherine and Anaı¨s, ask that the inheritance be
shared as a way to make sure that they each get what they are entitled to. In this sense,
then, signing off on the family report is more than a mere formality; it also represents a
chance for those who feel pushed aside in the family decision-making process to stand up
and stake their claims.
Those (judicial) formalities involve using official norms and institutions—either to legit-
imize or to challenge what had already been decided within the family (Merry 1990). They
also show that state courts “do” something that informal institutions do not: they bestow the
“state’s stamp” and the symbolic authority that goes along with it. This idea of the stamp,
or the “signature of the state” (Das 2004), has been investigated in various contexts (Alpes
2017; Hoag 2010; Merry 1990; Tuckett 2018). While Ellison (2017) describes how people
undergo mediation to obtain official-looking documents that they use to formalize rela-
tionships, in inheritance cases, people are not only looking to collect documents—whether
they are state-“like” or genuine—but also to mobilize the symbolic authority of formal
institutions to renegotiate the way decisions are made and property is distributed within the
family.
Beyond the Stamp: Challenging Family Decisions
Sometimes people claim rights and land in a more straightforward way than in the cases
above: they start litigation proceedings against their siblings. The following case illustrates
how courts are often perceived as having authority over all family members and as being
able to impose that authority when family meetings have failed to “restore order”—a phrase
litigants frequently used to explain why they went to court—between siblings. It shows that
beyond that stamp of authority, statehood is embodied though a set of norms—the CPF—
and institutions that people mobilize to define new (or challenge the “old”) categories of
authority within families.
The´re`se and Annie Boko brought their case to court in 2008, more than thirty years after
their father’s death. He left several family houses as well as acres of land in the suburbs of
the economic capital. His first-born son managed the family estate, followed by the next
male in line. One after the other, these executors—although not officially chosen as such by
the family—proceeded to sell plots that belonged to all twenty-three heirs. In the late 1990s,
Annie and The´re`se complained about the way the family estate was being managed. After
numerous family meetings, the executor finally identified a piece of land as “the women’s
share,” but he sold it several years later without informing them and without passing the
proceeds on to them. “This is why we decided to go to court—to show him that some of us
are not scared, that we can stand up to him,” The´re`se explained.14 Annie added, “We want
our share. What belongs to me, my share of my father’s estate, that is what I am asking the
court to give me.”15
This case, and many others like it, has to be considered within the context of today’s family
dynamics in Cotonou. Most people live in nuclear families; but single-parent households
are becoming more frequent and are generally headed by women, most of whom work and
provide for themselves as well as for their children, therefore legitimizing the clauses of the
Code that grant all siblings equal rights to inheritance. Referring to mandatory contributions
associated with particular events, such as weddings and funerals, Annie stated, “We always
pay our share. How come we are not entitled to any of the money that comes in?”16
The Boko sisters’ first request was introduced into the courts in 2008. A decision was
finally made in 2012, which The´re`se and Annie appealed because some of the plots of land
were not mentioned in the list of properties. Although they disagreed with the court’s initial
decision, for both women the justice system remains, as The´re`se said, “the only institution
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that is fit to decide which of us is right.” She added, “If the way properties are managed is
not clear, you have to complain to the highest level. This is why we went to the state, so
that if something belongs to us, it will be handed over to us.”17
Beyond the authority of the state, The´re`se and Annie made use of the categories that its
laws create, which have made selling or sharing properties possible in a way that customary
norms did not. By making land alienable, and therefore quantifiable and divisible, the
CPF has also fundamentally changed gender and generational relationships, introducing
calculation and individual rights into family dynamics.
Enforcing Judgments, or the Effects of Mobilizing the State
While the enforcement of legal decisions is rarely investigated in the anthropology of law
scholarship (cf. Andreetta 2016, 2018), it is a crucial part of the litigation process and says a
great deal about how litigants use state courts. Looking at what happens “after court” shows
that even though decisions are often not enforced or only partially enforced, they still act
as a bargaining tool—the power of which emanates from the state’s stamp on them—that
can be used to challenge family hierarchies and change the way resources are distributed.
Once a decision has been made, people have to contact the judge’s bailiff to either launch
an appeal or, if both parties accept the decision, to get the writ of execution. From that point
onward, the courts are no longer involved in the case. This is one reason why enforcement
is difficult to quantify: once a case has been decided, it becomes impossible to track other
than through the parties involved.
Judicial decisions in Cotonou, however, are not necessarily enforced. In inheritance cases,
enforcement depends in part on the judge’s instructions. If a public notary is appointed to sell
houses and plots of land, the writ of execution will be directly transmitted to the notary’s
office. Litigants have no say regarding whether the decision is enforced or not. Public
notaries are indeed only accountable to the court that appointed them, a condition about
which families regularly complain. They also complain about the length of the process: it
generally takes several years before the heirs can finally get money from a sale because the
administrative procedures associated with the compulsory liquidation of joint properties
are complex and require numerous steps that public notaries tend to follow scrupulously.
This is the second reason why quantifying enforcement is impossible: the process can be
delayed, paused, and then resumed after several years.
Appointing a public notary is, however, generally considered a last resort by family law
judges, who regularly warn litigants during hearings, “If you cannot come to an agreement,
I will appoint a public notary, and he will ‘eat’ most of the money and you will be left
with crumbs.”18 Alternative solutions include appointing a new executor if the existing
one is suspected of bias, validating a sharing plan, or allowing families to sell some of the
houses that they have inherited. In those cases, implementation is at the discretion of family
members. Those who “win” the case can get the writ of execution and ask the opposing
party to comply.
Nadia’s father was a truck driver. He died in 1975, leaving behind three wives and nine
children. He had already bequeathed his belongings: each wife and their children were
given the house that they lived in, as well as a house or a plot of land in the village they
were from. Each woman’s eldest son was also given a piece of land. Nadia’s mother had one
son and four daughters, of whom Nadia was the eldest. As the children got older, Nadia’s
mother handed responsibility for collecting rent from the houses over to her son, Alfred.
However, as Nadia explained, after their mother’s death, “He was keeping all of the money
to himself and doing whatever he wanted with it.”19
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The four sisters tried to reason with him, and asked for family meetings to be organized
to learn more about their inheritance and how it was being taken care of. The extended
family met on several occasions, suggesting a number of possible ways to share the houses
among the five children.
He just said he would not give up on his position as executor, and then he just
stopped showing up. He is not afraid of anybody . . . but he will be afraid of
the courts. He will have no choice but to comply.20
Nadia’s youngest sister, Ade´laı¨de, wrote to Cotonou’s high court in 2009. Her sisters joined
her in the request for a budget report from their brother and for a new executor. In 2012
the judge appointed Nadia and Ade´laı¨de as the new coexecutors. They did not inform their
brother that a decision had been taken against him: “We don’t know what his reaction is
going to be, so we would rather wait,” Nadia explained.21
Even though they did not formally notify Alfred about the decision, Nadia and Ade´laı¨de
started acting accordingly: they began collecting rent from new tenants in two of the five
rooms in the house, which they felt was a good first step toward a different distribution
of family resources. They also reported that they had sold one of the plots and that the
proceeds had been shared equally among all siblings. In other words, although the judge’s
decision had not (yet) officially been enforced, legal proceedings still had an impact on
family relationships and the way inheritance was distributed—which was the objective in
the first place.
In inheritance cases, judicial decisions in favor of the party that brought the case to court
often provide symbolic leverage, even when the decisions are not enforced. They can serve
as effective bargaining tools in the renegotiation of access to resources and redefinition of
family hierarchies. Litigants, therefore, often choose to enforce only some of the conditions
of the judgment. For example, while a decision might allow for the sale of real estate, in
fact houses and land in the village are almost never sold; they are seen as property that
belongs to and should remain in the extended family, to be transmitted from one generation
to the next.
Kohlhagen (2007) describes the lack of enforcement in rural Burundi as a symptom of
the “failure of the intervention of the state’s institutions” (3). When it comes to inheritance
disputes in Cotonou, I would argue that the lack of formal enforcement of legal decisions
does not necessarily indicate a failure of the system; it is more about using the authority of
public institutions and the documents they generate in a strategic and constructive manner.
By taking the dispute to court, Nadia and Ade´laı¨de managed to tip the balance of power and
change the way resources were allocated within their family; at least they can now collect
rent from tenants.
The aforementioned example, like most of the case studies that I collected, offers a
counterpoint to the widespread idea that litigation often fails to create social change
(Ben Hounet and Rupert 2018; Rosenberg 1991; Scheingold 1974). The case of inher-
itance disputes indeed shows that, in Cotonou, litigation triggers substantial changes in
family relationships, gender dynamics, and the way property is transmitted, shared, and
sold.
Conclusion
In this article, through the specific example of inheritance disputes, I have reflected on
the various ways in which citizens of Benin—in this case, family members involved in
inheritance disputes—perceive and mobilize state courts in Cotonou. I have also delved
into the reasons they bring a case to court and the way they use judicial decisions. Litigation
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indeed allows heirs to achieve a number of goals, ranging from gaining access to bank
accounts or state benefits to legitimizing family decisions and successfully challenging
family hierarchies.
A focus on litigants also illuminates the effects of judicial proceedings. In inheritance
cases, despite the fact that enforcement of decisions is often delayed or selective, litigation
nevertheless allows family members to solve the problem that brought them to court in the
first place. This conclusion runs counter to the idea, often argued in the sociolegal literature,
that law and litigation generally fail to generate social change. It also counters the claim
that formal legal reforms on the African continent are often only partially implemented
or get redirected, thus rarely bring about the intended effects (Anders 2014; Munoz 2014;
Rubbers and Gallez 2015).
Exploring the “users’ perspective” will help researchers think about litigants’ judicial
trajectories, which often involve different forums. These trajectories show that mediation
and informal dispute resolution are not always seen as a more efficient alternative to the
courts or as providing a more socially acceptable solution; in fact, they are sometimes used
as a way to gain access to state institutions. Careful analysis of judicial trajectories allows
for new understandings of the place of state courts in the resolution of disputes. In Cotonou,
although African public services are sometimes coproduced by private actors (Lund 2006),
when it comes to settling family disputes, citizens prefer going to the state because of its
symbolic power. This ultimately demonstrates the need for researchers to find a way both
methodologically and theoretically to look beyond the dichotomy of formal versus informal
norms and practices and start apprehending the state and its institutions through the lens
of the specific services that they provide and the ways in which ordinary citizens mobilize
them in order to achieve certain desired outcomes.22
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